Attackers switched supermarket freezers into defrost and heating mode across Europe this autumn. In the cases reported so far, nobody broke into a store. The refrigeration controllers were reachable from the internet, and attackers tried factory-default passwords on them.
We asked Henning Solberg, CTO and co-founder of IXT, eight questions about what went wrong and how to keep unattended equipment connected without exposing it. The interview was recorded on 11 November 2026. His answers are edited for length and clarity. For the full background on the incidents, read Freezer attacks across Europe show the risk of unattended devices on the open internet.
The freezer controllers sat on public IP addresses that anyone on the internet was able to reach, and whoever found them was free to try default usernames and passwords. The 4G connection was not the cause. A device with a public IP and no protection gets found on any network. The fix is to keep unattended devices on a private APN with no public address, and to give technicians Zero Trust access to one device at a time.
"If you put a public IP on it with no protection, it will be harmed by somebody, no matter what." Henning Solberg, CTO, IXT
The controllers sat on public IP addresses, open to anyone who tried default usernames and passwords.
What has been revealed to the public so far is that the controllers of these freezers have been placed on the public internet, basically just out in the open, on publicly accessible IP addresses available for anyone to connect to. So there's also a discussion about whether it's really hacking or not. It's unauthorised access to systems that are generally available.
That has caused problems, because anyone could log on to the devices and start guessing passwords using default passwords, default usernames, those kinds of things. That is what has been happening here.
In many stores, a third party or the manufacturer runs the refrigeration. It brings its own connection so its technicians reach the equipment without going through the store's network.
There are several good reasons for that. In most cases the store has its own wired network that handles tasks in the store itself. But some of the more advanced equipment in the modern store is also managed by a third party, or by the manufacturers. And they could have their own security policies, their own way of communicating with the devices.
So they create a separate connection for their technicians to monitor the freezers and troubleshoot when something goes wrong. That is the main reason for having a dedicated connection to this kind of equipment.
No. A public IP with no protection gets attacked over wired, Wi-Fi, satellite and cellular connections alike.
4G in itself is obviously just a carrier here. If you put a device on the open internet, whether it's a wired connection, a Wi-Fi connection, a satellite connection, whatever, if you put a public IP on it with no protection, it will be harmed by somebody, no matter what.
So 4G is not the problem. Cellular is a good way of connecting most devices. It's a cellular module, and it will connect to whatever network is available in most locations. That makes it an efficient way of connecting any equipment you want to monitor or control.
It talks to the back-end system of the manufacturer or service company, and to the technicians who maintain it. None of that requires the open internet.
The controller needs to talk to a back-end system that the manufacturer or the third party is using. That's how a typical IoT environment is built. The controller reports what's happening in the freezers it's connected to. If something goes out of range, the temperature, a compressor that stops working, faulty equipment in the freezers, the controller forwards alarms and messages about that.
It's also how technicians do remote troubleshooting and remote adjustment. And there are energy efficiency reasons for connecting it to a higher-level system that controls the temperature. So there are multiple reasons for talking to a central system.
The SIM gets a private address and is isolated from internet traffic. It reaches only the endpoints it needs, and its traffic stays separate from other customers on the mobile network. This setup is called a private APN.
A private connection in the mobile space is a different kind of connection, where you isolate the SIM itself from traffic on the internet.
Why do we need to send all of this data over the internet? It's not needed. Many of these systems are only talking to one endpoint, or maybe a couple of endpoints, that need to gather the data from the controller. The head-end system controls the device through a protocol. These are the only endpoints that talk to each other. There is no reason at all to put those out on the naked, open internet.
It's much more secure to put the device in a private environment where the endpoint address is a private one, and where its traffic is also separated from all other customers' traffic on the mobile network. That is the big difference between putting a public IP on the SIM and having a private APN, where you separate the traffic between customers.
A regular SIM sits behind network address translation, which blocks traffic that starts on the internet. Other attacks stay open, and a compromised device has full internet access to attack others. On a private APN, the SIM has no internet access to abuse.
A regular SIM you buy off the shelf gives you internet access. Most operators these days provide some protection in the form of network address translation. The SIM gets a private IP, gets NATed, and then gets internet access. That blocks some of the traffic that comes from the internet towards the device.
But there is session hijacking, there are UDP-based attacks, and there are other ways to manipulate the connections coming from a regular SIM. That's one of the issues we see with a regular SIM.
The other issue is the impact. If a SIM like that gets compromised, it has full access to the entire internet. If somebody gets control of the device that holds the SIM, and it isn't detected, they could attack others. That is how botnets have been formed over the years. A lot of unattended devices have been compromised, but the owner or the provider hasn't been able to detect it before it's too late. And then they can use all of these endpoints to attack other IP addresses on the open internet.
In a private environment with no internet access, because there is no need for internet access directly from that SIM, this would never happen.
Through Zero Trust remote access. It denies everything by default and gives the technician access to one controller, at the time they need it, instead of a VPN into the whole private APN.
In a private network, technicians and third parties still need access to the system, and there are multiple ways to solve that. The traditional way is a VPN. It used to be common to have VPN clients that create a tunnel from your device into the private APN, and then you get access to all the devices within that APN.
That creates a loophole. You need to make sure that anyone who connects with the VPN also maintains the security level you enforce in the private APN.
Taking that a step further means adding a Zero Trust mentality, and from a technical point of view, enforcing Zero Trust in the remote access to a private APN. That is what isolates the endpoints from each other. Basically deny everything and just allow the access you really need for remote troubleshooting.
In the case of the freezers, a technician sitting in Denmark who troubleshoots a controller in Italy should really just get access to that controller, at that point in time, if it's a third party. And that could easily be enforced with Zero Trust.
Which systems a third party or the vendor reaches remotely and how, whether a private APN is enforced, that nothing is connected to the open internet, and that there are no back doors.
Most enterprises are now looking at what kind of remote access and third-party access they have to the equipment in their facilities. Is there any unknown third-party access?
The obvious starting point is to figure out which third parties have access to your equipment. Can they control it remotely, or is it only monitoring? In IoT there are a lot of devices sending sensor information, temperature, moisture, anything that reports on what's going on at a remote location. Those could be a source of problems too, but not as much as a device you control remotely.
So that's the first thing to separate.
Do we have systems that have remote access from a third party, from the vendor, and how is that accessible? … Do they actually enforce a private APN? Make sure that nothing is connected to the open internet. Make sure there are no back doors for accessing those systems. I think that's the most important task anyone should do right now.
For the timeline of incidents and what CERT-FR and the manufacturers advise, read Freezer attacks across Europe show the risk of unattended devices on the open internet. For the contract side of a supplier's 4G modem, read Hacked freezer had its own 4G link, outside the store's firewall. Henning went further into Zero Trust for headless devices with Illumio in Zero Trust for IoT and OT: answers from our webinar with Illumio.
Running unattended equipment that a supplier maintains remotely? Ask us how a private APN with Zero Trust access works for your deployment.
This guidance is based on real IoT and OT deployments in regulated industries including energy, utilities, and industrial environments.
IXT designs and operates secure connectivity architectures where:
The patterns described here reflect how these environments are secured in practice, not theoretical models.
This article was written by the IXT Connectivity and Security team.
IXT operates a full MVNO core network and delivers secure IoT connectivity across 190+ countries and 600+ mobile networks. The team works directly with industrial, utilities, and infrastructure operators to design and secure large-scale IoT and OT deployments.
Their focus is on network-level Zero Trust architecture, SIM-based identity, and secure device communication without relying on VPNs or endpoint agents.