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Device makers now have 24 hours to report exploited flaws under the CRA

Written by IXT | Nov 16, 2026, 7:16:23 AM

Manufacturers of connected products sold in the EU must now report actively exploited vulnerabilities to ENISA within 24 hours of becoming aware of them. The duty, set out in Article 14 of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), has applied since 11 September 2026, 15 months before the rest of the regulation, and it covers products already on the market.

 

For makers of IoT and OT devices, the 24 hours is not the hardest part. Finding out is. Headless devices run no security agent and raise no alert when they are compromised, and the clock only starts once the manufacturer knows.

 

 

What the rule requires

An early warning goes to ENISA within 24 hours of awareness. A fuller notification follows within 72 hours, and a final report no later than 14 days after a fix or mitigation is available. Reports go through ENISA's single reporting platform, which opened on 11 September, to the national CSIRT. Affected users must be told as well. Breaching these obligations carries fines of up to €15 million or 2.5% of global turnover.

 

The rest of the CRA, including CE marking and the security requirements for new products, applies from December 2027.

 

 

The detection gap

On a laptop fleet, awareness comes from endpoint agents, logs and a security team watching both. Meters, controllers, chargers and sensors run on small microcontrollers with no room for an agent and no user to notice something odd. A compromised device keeps doing its job while doing someone else's as well.

 

The attacks on supermarket refrigeration this autumn showed how that plays out. Controllers at hundreds of supermarkets in 10 European countries were switched into defrost or heating mode. Their management interfaces were reachable from the internet, and most login attempts on decoy controllers tried factory-default passwords. The first public sign was the temperature, not a security alert.

 

That case was about exposure more than a classic software flaw, and whether it falls under Article 14 is a question for lawyers. The detection problem is the same either way. Henning Solberg, CTO at IXT: "A lot of unattended devices have been compromised, but the owner or the provider hasn't been able to detect it before it's too late. And then they can use all of these endpoints to attack other IP addresses on the open internet."

 

 

Visibility from the network side

If a device cannot report on itself, the network it uses has to. Every cellular device sends its traffic through a mobile core, where it is visible who the device talks to, which protocols it uses and how much data it moves.

 

IXT's Zero Trust Visualisation, built with Illumio, maps every connection an IXT-connected device makes and builds a baseline of normal behaviour. A device that has only ever talked to its own backend and starts calling an unknown server abroad shows up as a change. Customers set the alert thresholds, and the data feeds their SIEM.

 

"Securing access solved half the problem. Seeing what devices do solves the other half," said Henning Solberg.

 

That signal is not a CRA report. It is where one starts: an early sign that something has changed, and traffic records that help describe impact in the 72-hour notification.

 

 

Containing devices until the fix ships

The final report waits for a corrective measure, and firmware fixes take weeks to reach devices in the field. Network-side controls cover that gap. On a private APN through IXT SecureNet, a device has no public address for a scanner to find. With IXT Zero Trust, each device reaches only the connections it needs, so a vulnerable unit gives an attacker no path to the rest of the fleet. This is virtual patching: restricting what the device talks to until the update lands.

 

The same applies to remote access. "Basically deny everything and just allow the access you really need for remote troubleshooting," said Henning Solberg.

 

 

What stays with the manufacturer

IXT Zero Trust supports manufacturers preparing for the Cyber Resilience Act. It does not make a product CRA-compliant. The vulnerability handling process, the reports themselves, user notification and conformity assessment stay with the manufacturer, and the traffic map covers IXT-connected devices only.

 

Three questions for device makers to settle before the next incident. Who in the organisation becomes "aware" when a device in the field starts behaving differently, and how? Which servers did the fleet talk to last week? And how would exposure be cut if a product line turned out to be exploitable tomorrow?

 

Henning Solberg and Trevor Dearing of Illumio covered unpatchable devices, traffic maps and virtual patching in IXT's webinar. Watch the webinar on demand.

 

This article is also published as part of Secure SIM Insights, IXT's weekly newsletter on LinkedIn. Subscribe on LinkedIn

 

 

Why trust this guide

This guidance is based on real IoT and OT deployments in regulated industries including energy, utilities, and industrial environments.

 

IXT designs and operates secure connectivity architectures where:

 

  • devices are deployed across multiple countries and networks
  • SIM-level identity is enforced at the network edge
  • third-party access is controlled without VPNs
  • audit trails are required for regulatory compliance (including NIS2)

 

The patterns described here reflect how these environments are secured in practice, not theoretical models.

 

 

About the author

This article was written by the IXT Connectivity and Security team.

 

IXT operates a full MVNO core network and delivers secure IoT connectivity across 190+ countries and 600+ mobile networks. The team works directly with industrial, utilities, and infrastructure operators to design and secure large-scale IoT and OT deployments.

 

Their focus is on network-level Zero Trust architecture, SIM-based identity, and secure device communication without relying on VPNs or endpoint agents.