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Securing EV charging networks: vendors, protocols and remote access

Written by IXT | 17. nov. 2026, 02:45:00

Your charging network was not built in one go. It grew site by site, with chargers from several vendors. Now you run a fleet with several hardware makers, several firmware generations, several protocols, and several outside companies who need to log in and fix things. Every one of those adds a connection you have to account for.

 

EV charging was one of three use cases Henning Solberg, CTO at IXT, and Trevor Dearing of Illumio worked through in our webinar, Securing IoT Devices. IXT connects charging networks across Europe, and these five problems come up again and again.

 

 

1. A multi-vendor fleet

Some IXT charging customers run chargers from a long list of vendors. Each vendor builds its own microcontroller and control software into the charger. You cannot install a security agent on any of them, and you cannot standardise them after the fact.

The answer is to stop relying on the charger. IXT enforces policy in the network, so every charger gets the same rules whatever is inside it. The IXT SIM identifies the charger. SecureNet keeps its traffic on a private APN, off the public internet. Zscaler ZTNA in IXT's core network checks every session before a connection opens.

 

One policy model covers every vendor in the fleet.

 

 

2. Mixed protocols

Older chargers speak OCPP 1.6 or earlier. Newer ones add CoAP and MQTT for extra functions, control and updates. A rule set written for one protocol misses the others.

 

Trevor's principle for OT applies here: "Device A talks to device B using a specific protocol, and nothing else." Write down the backends and protocols each charger model needs. That list becomes your allow policy. The goal is that everything outside it is blocked. You get there in stages, starting with the connections that carry the most risk.

 

A protocol nobody approved has a short life on the network.

 

 

3. Connections nobody configured

You configure a charger to reach your OCPP backend, and that should be enough for it to work. Henning described what happens when you switch on traffic visibility. The cellular module inside the charger, supplied by its manufacturer, tries to reach a firmware server abroad to update itself. Time synchronisation and other protocols show up that nobody planned for.

 

IXT's Zero Trust Visualisation, powered by Illumio, maps every connection from every IXT-connected charger in real time. You see each destination, decide whether to allow it, and get flagged when the pattern changes.

 

The first map turns assumptions into a list of decisions.

 

 

4. Third-party remote access

When a charger fails, its vendor needs to log in and troubleshoot it. The traditional route is a VPN into the private APN. Henning's point in the webinar: that VPN gives the vendor access to the whole APN, not only their own chargers.

 

That is a wide door. The Verizon 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report found that 15% of breaches involved a third party, such as a supplier or a vulnerability in third-party software.

 

One European charging operator with eight hardware vendors needed to give each vendor access to its own chargers, without VPN conflicts and without network-wide access. IXT replaced the VPNs with privileged remote access through Zscaler. Each vendor gets a browser session to the specific chargers it supports, time-limited to business hours and recorded. No client install. No access beyond those chargers.

 

A compromised vendor laptop reaches one vendor's chargers, not the fleet.

 

 

5. Several chargers behind one router

At many sites, several chargers share a 4G or 5G CPE router on an Ethernet segment. That rebuilds a shared network at the far end of the cellular link. Henning called it a remote site where you do not know what is happening.

 

Inside each charger the picture repeats. Trevor walked through what sits in one box: the app connection that identifies a member, the card payment, and the SCADA link that controls the flow of electricity. All of these need to be kept separate. That is the case for micro-segmentation, which we will cover in a dedicated session.

 

Segmentation keeps an attacker in the first room they reach.

 

 

Where to start

Trevor's advice is risk-led. Label every system. Map what talks to what. First, surround the systems with the highest risk and exposure. Second, separate IT from OT. Third, apply explicit allow rules between the systems that matter most. Default deny is the end state, not day one.

 

Regulation gives you a deadline as well as a reason. For what NIS2 asks of charging operators, read understanding NIS2 OT connectivity for EV charging.

 

 

Watch the EV charging segment

Henning and Trevor discuss EV charging from 40:52 in the recording.

 

Why trust this guide

This guidance is based on real IoT and OT deployments in regulated industries including energy, utilities, and industrial environments.

IXT designs and operates secure connectivity architectures where:

  • devices are deployed across multiple countries and networks
  • SIM-level identity is enforced at the network edge
  • third-party access is controlled without VPNs
  • audit trails are required for regulatory compliance (including NIS2)

The patterns described here reflect how these environments are secured in practice, not theoretical models.

 

About the author

This article was written by the IXT Connectivity and Security team.

IXT operates a full MVNO core network and delivers secure IoT connectivity across 190+ countries and 600+ mobile networks. The team works directly with industrial, utilities, and infrastructure operators to design and secure large-scale IoT and OT deployments.

Their focus is on network-level Zero Trust architecture, SIM-based identity, and secure device communication without relying on VPNs or endpoint agents.