The safest way to give an equipment supplier remote access is to keep the device off the internet and control each session. The device sits on a private mobile network with no public address. The supplier's technician gets access to that one device, for as long as the job takes, through a session that is checked and recorded. Nothing else on the network is in reach.
That sounds obvious. Most estates are set up differently, and the gap sits in equipment your own IT team has never seen.
Refrigeration, heating and ventilation, alarm panels, EV chargers and energy meters are in many cases maintained by the manufacturer or a service contractor. They bring their own connection, a 4G router or a SIM in the controller, so their technicians reach the equipment without going through your network.
Henning Solberg, CTO and co-founder of IXT, describes the set-up in a modern store:
"Some of the more advanced equipment in the modern store is also managed by a third party, or by the manufacturers. And they could have their own security policies, their own way of communicating with the devices."
The arrangement makes sense for the supplier. It also means a device on your premises sits outside your firewall, configured to somebody else's policy.
In autumn 2026, attackers reached refrigeration controllers in stores across Europe. The controllers sat on public IP addresses, and anyone who found them was free to try default usernames and passwords. Henning's verdict: "It's unauthorised access to systems that are generally available."
The freezers are one case of a pattern that repeats across unattended equipment.
Some SIMs on a standard internet APN hand the device a public IP address. A public address with no protection gets found, whether the link is 4G, fixed line or satellite. As Henning puts it: "If anyone in the world is able to reach the device, sooner or later someone will."
A technician needs to reach the controller's web page, so somebody forwards a port on the router. Unless somebody closes it afterwards, the port stays open, guarded by whatever password was set on day one.
Where the devices do sit on a private APN, the supplier gets a VPN account into it. Henning explains why that moves the problem instead of solving it:
"Back in the days, it was quite common to have VPN clients, and that creates a tunnel from your device into the private APN, and then you get access to all the devices within that APN. Obviously that creates a loophole with the VPN. You need to make sure that anyone that connects with the VPN also maintains the security level that you are enforcing in the private APN."
A supplier laptop you do not manage now reaches every device on the network.
Three changes close those gaps. Each sits in the network, so none of them needs software on the device.
Put the device on a private APN with a private address. Its traffic goes to the systems it serves and nowhere else, so a scan of the internet finds nothing to talk to. A freezer controller, for example, needs the supplier's back-end system for readings and alarms, and a way in for the technician. That is the whole list.
"Many of these systems are only talking to one endpoint, or maybe a couple of endpoints… There is no reason at all to put those out on the naked, open internet."
IXT does this with SecureNet, which keeps device traffic on a private APN and routes it to the customer's data centre or cloud.
A private APN hides traffic but doesn't defend it. Inside it, devices reach each other unless something stops them. Write explicit allow rules for each device and block the rest. Henning's rule of thumb: "Basically deny everything and just allow the access you really need for remote troubleshooting."
Henning's example: a technician in Denmark troubleshooting a controller in Italy "should really just get access to that controller, at that point in time, if it's a third party. And that could easily be enforced with Zero Trust."
With IXT Zero Trust, the technician opens a browser session to the specific device. There is no VPN client to install. The session is time-limited and recorded, and it reaches that device and nothing beyond it. Access is tied to a person and a time window, not a standing credential.
Henning's advice for anyone who runs equipment a third party maintains is to start with an inventory of remote access. These six questions get you there.
Ask for the device, the connection type and who supplied the SIM or router. Include equipment you do not think of as connected.
The answer you want is no, for every device. Ask how they know.
If not, ask where the traffic lands and what else reaches the device through that path.
A VPN into a shared network answers "everything on it". The answer you want is "the one device they came to fix".
You need to know who touched which device, when and what they did. A supplier's own record that you never see does not count.
Shared credentials outlive the people who used them. Access tied to a named person and a time window does not.
Henning closes his own supplier checklist in the interview with this: "I think that's the most important task anyone should do right now."
A secure connection removes the exposure and gives you the session record. It does not replace your own supplier governance. Deciding which suppliers get access, writing access into contracts, and keeping your risk documentation and incident response plans current remain your work. If NIS2 applies to you, supply chain security and access control are named measures in Article 21(2), and IXT Zero Trust addresses the technical controls behind them. It does not make you compliant on its own.
In this 13-minute interview, Henning covers secure technician access from 8:43 and the questions for suppliers from 10:38. For the wider architecture, read what network-level Zero Trust for IoT devices means.
Want to see it on your own equipment? Request a test SIM or book a demo.
This guidance is based on real IoT and OT deployments in regulated industries including energy, utilities, and industrial environments.
IXT designs and operates secure connectivity architectures where:
The patterns described here reflect how these environments are secured in practice, not theoretical models.
This article was written by the IXT Connectivity and Security team.
IXT operates a full MVNO core network and delivers secure IoT connectivity across 190+ countries and 600+ mobile networks. The team works directly with industrial, utilities, and infrastructure operators to design and secure large-scale IoT and OT deployments.
Their focus is on network-level Zero Trust architecture, SIM-based identity, and secure device communication without relying on VPNs or endpoint agents.